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‘Nehru, Tibet And China’: The Hostilities And Statements That Finally Led India Into War In 1962

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‘Nehru, Tibet And China’: The Hostilities And Statements That Finally Led India Into War In 1962
An excerpt from AS Bhasin’s book on the history behind the relationship between India and China

by AS Bhasin

In the meantime, clashes which for sometime were confined to western sector began taking place in the eastern sector too. An attack on an Indian patrol, three miles to the south of the Thagla Ridge in the eastern sector, had resulted in three casualties. In yet another incident, one Chinese was killed and one injured. The Chinese not only demanded compensation for the killed and injured, but also an apology.

This was a new situation. The attention now appeared to be shifting from the western sector to the eastern one. Che Dong in the eastern sector became the new hotspot. It was the place where the incident had taken place and China claimed it to be north of the Thagla Ridge in Chinese territory. On 20 September, China had already lodged a protest against the Indian troops crossing the McMahon Line and establishing an aggressive strongpoint at Che Dong, Le Village.

India rejected China’s accusation of crossing the Thagla Ridge, which was the boundary defined by the McMahon line in that region, and instead accused China of intruding south of the line into Che Dong of Le village in the Indian territory.

India described the Chinese demand for apology as “misconceived” and insisted that no Indian forces or defence works of any kind existed to the north of the Thagla Ridge. Along with these fresh cases of intrusion in the eastern region, the incidents of border violations in the western sector, too, continued unabated.

Che Dong in the NEFA area had become active since 8 September. It was under dispute, as China claimed that it lay north of the McMahon Line and India insisted it was south of it. In its note of 13 October, China accused India of air-dropping its soldiers north of the McMahon Line “in preparation for war” and warned that the Chinese frontier guards would continue to strike back resolutely. India had rejected the Chinese accusation and accused China of adopting a “dual” policy of professing a desire for peaceful settlement, while pursuing the “path of flagrant aggression”. India strongly asserted that “no threat of force or use of force (would) deter the GoI from their firm determination to defend the territorial integrity of India”.

The escalation in border incidents and casualties bode ill for peace between the two neighbours. A worried Government of India had for some time been thinking of measures to retrieve some of its freshly occupied territory by China in the eastern sector. It thought that this would convey a strong message to China – that India would not take Chinese intrusions lying down any more.

At a review meeting in the chamber of the minister of defence on 22 September, the chief of army staff had asked specifically “whether action to evict the Chinese can be taken as soon as the Brigade has concentrated”. It was pointed out that “the decision throughout has been, as discussed in the previous meeting, that the army should prepare and throw the Chinese out as soon as possible. The Chief of the Army Staff was accordingly directed to take action for the eviction of the Chinese in Kameng division of NEFA as soon as he was ready.”

It was clearly meant to be a limited action by a brigade in the specific area of Kemong Division where the Thagla Ridge was located. A brigade could not launch attacks all along the border, stretching for thousands of kilometres. Nehru on 12 October, while he was leaving for Colombo, said to journalists at the airport that he had issued instructions to the army to clear the Indian territory of Chinese intrusions, and the date for it had been left to the army to decide.

This impromptu remark proved most unfortunate. Coming from the highest political authority, it sounded like a war bugle.

Nehru’s was an unqualified statement giving the impression that India was about to undertake some action against China. It provided China an alibi to act on its aggressive agenda all along the borders in both the sectors in full force. Some confusion had already been created by a press report in the Times of India that said:

[A] task force was being sent to NEFA charged with pushing the Chinese out.

It was probably a leak, but a garbled version of the above-mentioned decision had appeared in the Times of India. Nehru objected to the report and asked the army chief, Gen Thapar, on 5 October 1962 about it and yet, a week later, he himself made that provocative statement. Though the Times of India report was denied, the real damage was done by Nehru’s casual but provocative warning to China.

Two days after Nehru’s warning, on 14 October, Defence Minister Krishna Menon poured more fuel to the fire with his thundering speech in Bangalore where he reiterated: “India’s determination to push the invading Chinese out of NEFA areas…” His remarks following the prime minister’s did give the impression that something indeed was cooking.

These remarks were exploited by the Chinese to pin the responsibility for the war on India’s shoulders. Nehru’s biographer, Dr Gopal, making light of Nehru’s remarks described it as a “wholly unobjectionable statement”. He said that the policy of evicting the Chinese was not a new one, and he quoted another statement of Nehru in Colombo, “I do not think they have the slightest claim, historically, politically, or anything.” Whatever the justification, to announce publicly and casually a decision with wide implications, when the tension on the borders was already running high, could hardly be described as prudent.

Gopal felt there was no complacency in Nehru’s approach. Nehru had seen that the situation in the eastern sector was deteriorating fast and, at long last, he had realised that trouble on a big scale was in the offing.

Was India actually prepared or was preparing for the action that happened on 20 October?

If one were to analyse the above mentioned decision of the meeting held at the defence ministry, it was meant to be a localised affair in the Kemong Division of the NEFA in the area where border violations were taking place in recent days. A brigade can take action in a limited area specifically assigned to it. Even otherwise, the ground situation and the circumstances did not justify a large-scale action.

Defence Minister Krishna Menon was in New York from 17 to 30 September to attend the UNGA session. On 8 September, the prime minister had left for London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference and returned only on 2 October after visiting Paris, Lagos and Accra and was again away to Colombo for a pre-scheduled engagement from 12 to 16 October. The chief of general staff, Lt Gen Kaul, was holidaying in Kashmir until 2 October.

It is inconceivable that a country preparing for a war would allow its top political leaders and military brass, responsible for crucial war-related decisions, to be away from the capital.

As against this, if one were to look at the massive attack China launched all along the frontier in both the eastern and western sectors, it would convince anybody that China indeed was in any case ready for an all-out war, as otherwise, logistically speaking, it was not possible to gather such a massive force scattered along the most challenging borders in a week’s time after Nehru’s impromptu remarks of 12 October.

That China had actually decided to go to war with India on the border question has been admitted by a Chinese scholar Chaowu Dai, distinguished professor at the Yunnan University and the director of YNU Institute for India Studies in Kunming, who in his lengthy paper said:

From 1960 to October 1962 judging that India was unwilling to negotiate a solution, China made preparations for deployment of its military and adopted a policy of “never yield while striving to avoid bloodshed, create interlocking positions for long-term armed coexistence” on the border issue ultimately proceeding to the border conflict.

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INS Arihant’s Nuke-Capable K-4 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile ‘Ready To Roll’

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INS Arihant’s Nuke-Capable K-4 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile ‘Ready To Roll’


NEW DELHI: India tested its nuclear capable K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), designed to have a strike range of 3,500 km, for the second time in six days on Friday. The missile test, as the one conducted on January 19, was undertaken from an undersea platform in the shape of a submersible pontoon off the coast of Andhra Pradesh according to a report by Rajat Pandit of TOI.

The solid-fuelled K-4 missile is being developed by DRDO to arm the country’s nuclear-powered submarines in the shape of INS Arihant and its under-development sister vessels. INS Arihant, which became fully operational in November 2018 to complete India’s nuclear triad, is currently armed with the much shorter K-15 missiles with a 750 km range.

“The K-4 is now virtually ready for its serial production to kick-off. The two tests have demonstrated its capability to emerge straight from underwater and undertake its parabolic trajectory,” said a source.

India has the land-based Agni missiles, with the over 5,000-km Agni-V inter-continental ballistic missile now in the process of being inducted, and fighter jets jury-rigged to deliver nuclear weapons. But INS Arihant gives the country’s deterrence posture much more credibility because nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear-tipped missiles are considered the most secure, survivable and potent platforms for retaliatory strikes.

Once the K-4 missiles are inducted, they will help India narrow the gap with countries like the US, Russia and China, which have over 5,000-km range SLBMs. The K-4 missiles are to be followed by the K-5 and K-6 missiles in the 5,000-6,000 km range class.

The 6,000-ton INS Arihant, which is propelled by an 83 MW pressurised light-water reactor at its core, in turn, is to be followed by INS Arighat, which was launched in 2017. The next generation of nuclear submarines, currently called S-4 and S-4*, will be much larger in size.





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After Upgradation, Sukhoi Su-30MKI Indigenisation To Reach 78%

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After Upgradation, Sukhoi Su-30MKI Indigenisation To Reach 78%


India has received clearance to upgrade 84 Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighter jets, which will result in 78% indigenization after the upgrade

In a significant step towards bolstering its military might with indigenously developed technology, India is poised to witness its Russian-origin Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighter jets evolve into a domestic platform. Speaking at a recent lecture.

The upgrade program is being led by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in partnership with the Indian Air Force and other partners. The upgrade is expected to cost US$7.5 billion.

The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) granted Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for the upgrade. The upgrade is part of India’s efforts to improve the capabilities of its primary fighter aircraft, it refers to as the “Super Sukhoi”.

This initiative is a part of a larger effort by the Indian Air Force to modernize its ageing fleet. Air Chief Marshal Chaudhari asserted the critical role of an offensive air force as demonstrated in current global conflicts and emphasized India’s move towards an indigenized arsenal. To this end, the IAF has been proactive, from upgrading its Mirage 2000 to enhancing its MiG-29 fleet.

In summary, the IAF’s commitment to updating their combat forces with the latest technology, including shifting to fifth-generation fighter jets, ensures operational preparedness and a strong deterrence capability. The gradual indigenization of its air fleet marks a pivotal shift in India’s defence landscape, reducing dependency on foreign imports and fostering technological sovereignty.





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Akash Weapon System Exports For The Armenian Armed Forces Gathers Pace

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Akash Weapon System Exports For The Armenian Armed Forces Gathers Pace


According to unconfirmed reports, Armenia is a top contender for an export order for Akash SAM system manufactured by Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL).

While there is no official confirmation because of the sensitivities involved, documents suggest that the order for the same has already been placed the report further added.
There are nine countries, in turn, which have shown interest in the indigenously-developed Akash missile systems, which can intercept hostile aircraft, helicopters, drones and subsonic cruise missiles at a range of 25-km. They are Kenya, Philippines, Indonesia, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Vietnam and Algeria reported TOI.

The Akash export version will also be slightly different from the one inducted by the armed forces. The 100-km range air-to-air Astra missiles, now entering production after successful trials from Sukhoi-30MKI fighters, also have “good export potential”, said sources.

Akash is a “tried, tested and successfully inducted systems”. Indian armed forces have ordered Akash systems worth Rs 24,000 crore over the years, and MoD inked a contract in Mar 2023 of over Rs 9,100 crores for improved Akash Weapon System

BDL is a government enterprise under the Ministry of Defence that was established in 1970. BDL manufactures surface-to-air missiles and delivers them to the Indian Army. BDL also offers its products for export.

Akash Weapon System

The AWS is a Short Range Surface to Air Missile (SRSAM) Air Defence System, indigenously designed and developed by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). In order to meet aerial threats, two additional Regiments of AWS with Upgradation are being procured for Indian Army for the Northern borders. Improved AWS has Seeker Technology, Reduced Foot Print, 360° Engagement Capability and improved environmental parameters.

The project will give a boost to the Indian missile manufacturing industry in particular and the indigenous defence manufacturing ecosystem as a whole. The project has overall indigenous content of 82% which will be increased to 93% by 2026-27.

The induction of the improved AWS into the Indian Army will increase India’s self-reliance in Short Range Missile capability. This project will play a role in boosting the overall economy by avoiding outgo of precious foreign exchange to other countries, increasing employment avenues in India and encouraging Indian MSMEs through components manufacturing. Around 60% of the project cost will be awarded to the private industry, including MSMEs, in maintaining the supply chain of the weapon system, thereby creating large scale of direct and indirect employment.





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