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Police: If IDF shared intel on Oct. 6, Nova partiers might have survived – report
Some police officials have accused the IDF and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) of withholding security threat information overnight between October 6 and 7, which, if it had been shared with the police, could have saved the lives of 364 civilians who were killed at the Nova party and the 44 hostages who were taken.
First reported by Channel 12 at the end of the weekend, the Acting Police Commander for the Negev Area in the South Eyal Azulai is quoted as saying that the police had always been unsure about the safety of the Nova party attendees and that if they had known about the enhanced security threat, they might have ended the party before the invasion took place.
The warnings that Azulai was referring to led to at least two consultations among and between the Shin Bet and the IDF in the middle of the night between October 6 and 7.
It appears that an aspect of these warnings were IDF intelligence seeing somewhere between dozens to hundreds of Israeli SIM cellphone cards switching on within Gaza, something drawing suspicion of a potential attempted penetration into Israel since Israelis cannot safely reside in Gaza.The various warnings eventually led to a decisive conference call between IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi, Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar, and other senior IDF officials in which the Shin Bet decided to send a small additional crew of reinforcements to the border, and all of the security officials agreed to discuss the situation more the next day.
However, either because the security chiefs did not view the threat as terribly significant or because they did not want to widen the circle of intelligence sharing to the police, who they might have trusted less with such sensitive information, they did not even tell the police that anything problematic was afoot.
Asked to respond to the allegations, the IDF gave a generic non-denial denial, saying only that it is still probing the Nova party incident and that it will present its findings to the public when it concludes the probe.
However, given that the IDF had originally said it would publish the probe in June and then sometime over the course of July and August, IDF and police officials have been now regularly leaking findings from all of the different military probes in order to try to frame the public’s view of them before the official reports are issued.
In the past, certain IDF officials have tried to blame the police for allowing the Nova party to go forward in such a secure area and for reacting slowly to save the Nova party attendees, given that technically, it had more direct responsibility for their safety than for the many Gaza border towns which Hamas invaded and which were supposed to be protected by the IDF.
This latest leak places the onus on the IDF and the Shin Bet (which has been even more opaque than the IDF, not providing a single public update to date about its October 7 failures) for failing to warn the police of the increased danger they knew about overnight between October 6 and 7.
No Israeli official had any idea of the scale of Hamas’s invasion
Even though no one in the IDF or the Shin Bet had any idea of the scale of the size of the impending invasion, even a warning of a small penetration, which they were worried about, might have been enough to get the police to close the Nova party and evacuate the attendees.
Next, the Channel 12 report tries to compliment the police for evacuating a significant percentage of the Nova party attendees once Hamas’s invasion started, as well as for setting up a defense position on Route 232, which slowed Hamas’s advance against some of the attendees.
However, the report also said that then-Israel Police chief Kobi Shabtai did not even call Halevi for more help until 11:45 a.m., by which time it was already too late to save many of the Nova party residents.
Also, at that point, neither Halevi nor Shabtai made any bold moves to send a larger amount of reinforcement forces rapidly to the Nova party despite the fact that there were far more civilians there than in the many other locations that Hamas was invading.
As has become clear by a variety of IDF briefings, top IDF officials were either still in shock or lacked a clear picture of myriad places where Hamas had invaded and did not even assign field commanders to certain areas until around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon, and full reinforcement forces did not arrive in some places until even later.
By then, the entire police position at Route 232 had been overrun, and most Nova party civilians who had stayed near police were either killed or kidnapped.
There is an ongoing unresolved disagreement between the IDF and the police about which side had more doubts about holding the Nova party and which side was more negligent in allowing it to go forward in such a dangerous area so close to Gaza in the first place.
A variety of IDF officials have said they had not even been updated by other IDF officials that the party was taking place.
Yet, IDF Southern Command Chief of Staff Brig.-Gen. Manor Yanai had told Azulai that there was no security issue with the Nova party, and despite that statement, did not later update Azulai or any other police officials that the situation had changed, according to Channel 12.
The lack of updates to the police from ]IDF Southern Command would stand even more since IDF Southern Commander Maj.-Gen. Yaron Finkleman, Yanai’s boss, abandoned his vacation in northern Israel in the middle of the night to rush south to his base at Beersheba to have a closer hand on the situation.
This week, a special tour group of Knesset members is expected to visit various schools in east Jerusalem as part of the work of the ‘Subcommittee for Curricula in east Jerusalem and Their Supervision’ headed by MK Avichai Boaron of Likud. Due to security and political sensitivities, only subcommittee members will be allowed to participate in the visit under heavy security.
During the visit, Knesset members will be able to discuss and meet face-to-face with relevant factors in the education system, learn about existing challenges and opportunities, and examine ways to improve and enhance learning and teaching processes to meet the government’s targets for transitioning students from Palestinian to Israeli curricula.
MK Boaron emphasized that the visit is intended to allow Knesset members to get a firsthand impression of what’s happening in East Jerusalem schools and to formulate an up-to-date and accurate picture that will serve as a basis for promoting wise and effective policy in the field of education in the eastern part of the city.
Boaron added, “The subcommittee under my leadership is committed to working to improve the quality of education in East Jerusalem, while ensuring quality curricula adapted to the needs of the students. We believe that education is the key to integration and advancement of society in the eastern part of the city, and we will do everything in our power to ensure that every student gets the opportunity to realize their potential.”In a discussion held a few days ago in the Education Committee’s subcommittee, the data behind the government’s decision regarding education in East Jerusalem was revealed, budgeted at one billion NIS, and far from meeting its goals.
The committee’s findings
The committee also revealed that 6000 out of 6700 teachers were trained in the Palestinian Authority, and 85 percent of schools (over 90,000 out of 110,000 students) still study the Palestinian Authority’s curriculum.
The data also showed that close to 200 million NIS from the amount allocated for this matter in the government’s decision were invested in the program. Still, only 2000 students have transitioned in the last two years from the Palestinian program to the Israeli program. In fact, the State of Israel invests one million NIS to transition a student in East Jerusalem from the Palestinian program to the Israeli one.
In the discussion ahead of the special tour, Boaron said, “This committee was established to deal with a problem that is nothing less than a powder keg placed in the heart of Jerusalem, the capital city of the State of Israel. Before we go to ‘de-Nazify’ the students of the Gaza Strip, we must examine the learning content here in Jerusalem. After many years under the minister’s leadership, incitement content was removed from the learning materials. In parallel, about a year and a half ago, the minister led a government decision to replace the Palestinian curriculum with an Israeli curriculum. This decision is good and important. However, this decision did not bring about the desired change – east Jerusalem residents are not interested in adopting the Israeli curriculum, and the teachers themselves are not willing to teach the program.”
“My colleagues and I will do everything to change this delusional reality. This intolerable situation cannot continue.” He continued.
“The latest government decision on this issue speaks of slow and gradual treatment of the problem before us, but this is a big mistake. The treatment of this problem must be sharp and quick. In the coming months, if the situation does not change significantly for the better, I will turn to the Prime Minister and recommend canceling the government’s decision on the matter and making a completely different decision. We need to deal with the complex problems existing in the current education of east Jerusalem students in a much more stubborn and severe manner than what is happening today. The committee’s discussions help us understand the scope of the problem and its severity and decide on the best tools to deal with its correction.”
Following that discussion, MK Boaron sent a letter to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Education, and other officials to share the data and conclusions and even proposed an innovative idea to examine cooperation with Arab countries and connect them to the education system in east Jerusalem.
“Education in east Jerusalem is a national event, no less.” MK Boaron concluded, “And that’s how it should be treated, with seriousness and gravity. For decades we have allowed this bomb to grow quietly and without interference, with God’s help we intend to study the issue in depth, and lead significant processes in the matter together with all the factors, the existing situation must change.”
There is no question about it: Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar has trapped somebody – the only question is whom? Has he trapped Israel into falling clumsily into the regional war that he always wanted on October 7, with all of the negatives that entails?
Or has he trapped Iran, and its main proxy Hezbollah, into prematurely wasting their great moments, capabilities, and threats to aid Sinwar’s lost cause in Gaza, instead of reserving them to deter Jerusalem from attacking Iran’s nuclear program?
Going back in time, Sinwar’s calculation – until now, miscalculation – was that if he invaded southern Israel, Hezbollah, Iran, Yemen, Syrian militias, West Bank terrorists, and Arab Israelis would all join in.
In his best-case scenario, Hezbollah would have invaded Israel’s northern villages just as Hamas was invading the South, providing a one-two punch that would have confused and paralyzed the IDF even more than it was from Hamas’s stunningly successful initial thrust.It also would have rocketed large portions of Israel to create further chaos and disorder and put Israelthe Jewish state on the defensive.
Instead, Hezbollah sufficed with a mostly symbolic (at a strategic level) string of rocket and drone attacks on only on Israel’s villages and cities located very close to the border.
At the earliest stages, Hezbollah did not attack the Golan Heights or places like Safed, Acre, or Nahariya.
Yemen never joined in anything more than a sporadic way and onwith a significant delay.
Iran neverdidn’t joined until April, and since then has mostly remained on the sidelines.
The other fronts have been quiet or nonstrategic factors.
But maybe after waiting 11 months, Sinwar could have trapped Israel into picking a larger fight with Hezbollah, which could finally bring Hezbollah, Iranthe Lebanese-based terrorist group, its Iranian sponsor, and others into the war in a more full-fledged fashion.
Sinwar also hoped to delay or end the trend of Israeli normalization with moderate Sunni Arab countries, such as with the Saudis, which seemed imminent in September 2023.
LastLastly, he hoped to undermine Israel’s alliances with the US, UK, and EU, and to get Israel in trouble with international courts.
In turn, this could lead Israel to finally agree to his terms of allowing Hamas to remain in power and to releasing massive numbers of Palestinian security prisoners. He could then be seen as the new Palestinian “Saladin” of the 21st century – the man who brought Israel to its knees and forced it to recognize Hamas.
This is no fantasy.
Normalization with the Saudis has been delayed, alliances with the West have been frayed, and international courts are after Israel in an unprecedented fashion, even as compared to prior wars.
The unanswered dilemma is who will come out on top in the escalating conflict with Hezbollah.
If Hezbollah manages to harm Israel enough with its rocket arsenal or outlast Jerusalem enough to force improved ceasefire terms for itself and Hamas, Sinwar’s trap will have succeeded, albeit with an 11-month delay.
But this is far from the most likely scenario.
Since last Tuesday, Hezbollah has been battered and pummeled in ways it never expected.
The Lebanese terror group has lost 3,000-4,000 fighters, its Radwan commander Ibrahim Aqil and 13-15 of his subordinate commanders, more than 500 rocket launchers, and many thousands of rockets.
What if the IDF at some point overcomes Hezbollah’s ability to swarm it with long-range precision rockets and enormous volumes of short-range rockets?
What if the IDF at some point achieves an overmatch capability against Hezbollah where its main threats against Israel are neutered, if not neutralized?
Shockingly, this might even be possible without an invasion.
Or what if the IDF manages an invasion of Lebanon without Hezbollah being able to destroy large stretches of the home front with its rocket arsenal juggernaut, as had always been predicted in worst-case scenarios?
The whole purpose of Hezbollah from Iran’s perspective, which provides its rocket arsenal, funding, and training, was to deter Israel from ever attacking Tehran’s nuclear facilities, lest it give up its ace in the hole.
What if Sinwar had led Hezbollah into a war it was not ready to fight, with the IDF achieving massive strategic surprise and suddenly degrading the Hezbollah threat to a point where it no longer served to deter the Jewish state from acting against Iran?
In that case, Sinwar’s trap will have boomeranged into undermining the head of the axis of Middle Eastern evil, Iran, as well as defanging its top proxy threat – Hezbollah.
He would then go down in history as not only the destroyer of Gaza but as the gambler who bungled decades of careful Iranian planning and put Israel in its strongest security position in years
Abd Al-Salam Haniyeh, the son of the killed Hamas terror leader Ismail Haniyeh, claimed in an August interview with SamaQuds that his father rejected the “deal of a century” which would have seen the establishment of Palestinian statehood, according to a translation by the Middle East Media Research Institute.
Haniyeh Jr. claimed that the deal would have allegedly seen billions invested into Gaza.
“May our hands be paralyzed if we sign an agreement which would separate Gaza from Palestine,” the Hamas leader has allegedly said in response to the proposed deal.
The deal would have also encompassed the disarmament of Hamas.
Haniyeh also claimed that media coverage of the 2008-2009 conflict also saw increased convoys entering the Gaza Strip, which led to more active construction of terror tunnels.
Rejecting statehood
The Palestinian leadership has rejected multiple deals that would see the establishment of Palestinian statehood. In 1936, the British offered the Peel Commission, which would have seen a separate Arab state but which was rejected by the Palestinian leadership, according to CIJA.
In 1948, Palestinian leadership rejected the Partition Plan, which also encompassed an opportunity for statehood. In 2000, under Prime Minister Ehud Barak, the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, again rejected an offer of statehood. Finally, as referenced by Haniyeh, in 2008, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas rejected a land-for-peace offer.
Hamas officials have continued to speak against a two-state solution in conversation with Arab media, insisting on a singular Arab nation.
Ismail Haniyeh
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in July while attending the inauguration of Iran’s new president in Tehran.
While Israel neither accepted nor denied responsibility for the attack, Iran has promised to retaliate.
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