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The need to define the new US catchphrase: A ‘revitalized’ PA – analysis
The US and Israel are in total agreement about the need to topple Hamas, have different expectations about how this can be done, and disagree fundamentally about the future of Gaza when the war against Hamas ends.
Since day one, or rather from October 7, the Biden Administration has not wavered in its understanding of Israel’s need to dismantle Hamas. And that understanding manifested itself in unstinting moral and material support.
Early on, however, differences appeared regarding the tactics that can be used to achieve that goal. For instance, immediately after the Simchat Torah massacre, Israel wanted to cut off all electricity, fuel and water into Gaza—something the US opposed, pressing Israel to allow in trucks of humanitarian aid.
Differences expanded
Over the last two months, these differences have expanded, with the US now publicly pressing Israel to do more to protect Gazan civilians during the warfare, not to lead to any more temporary massive population displacements, and to let even more humanitarian and economic aid into the area. So far, however, the two sides have been able to work out the tactical differences, and they have not translated into any significant crisis.
Regarding the vision for the day after, or who exactly is going to take control of Gaza once Hamas is toppled, there are significant differences, and these came into stark relief on Saturday in comments made by Vice President Kamala Harris and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
VP Harris on Israel-Hamas war
Harris, speaking about the Israel-Hamas war at the UN climate conference in Dubai, said that since shortly after October 7, the Biden administration has held internal discussions, as well as deliberations with partners in the region and around the world, about what a post-conflict Gaza will look like.
“Five principles guide our approach for post-conflict Gaza: no forceful displacement, no re-occupation, no siege or blockade, no reduction in territory, and no use of Gaza as a platform for terrorism. We want to see a unified Gaza and West Bank under the Palestinian Authority, and Palestinians’ voices and aspirations must be at the center of this work.”
If you look closely at those five principles, there is agreement on most of them. Israel is not intent on permanently displacing the Gaza population. The steps taken to clear Gazan citizens out of northern Gaza were meant only to clear civilians out of a battle zone to enable the IDF to fight terrorists there with minimal civilian deaths. The same principle will now be used to a lesser degree in southern Gaza.
Calls for resettlement of Gush Katif?
While some voices inside the government call for the resettlement of Gush Katif, this is not Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or the government’s policy. Netanyahu and the government have stated that there is no intention of permanently reoccupying Gaza, though there is an interest in retaining overall security control of the area so that Hamas does not reemerge once it is defeated.
Regarding the siege or blockade of Gaza, Israel’s blockade of Gaza was put into place to prevent Hamas from doing what it did anyhow—build itself into a military power. If Hamas is no longer in control, the purpose for a blockade will be obviated as long as the force that eventually controls Gaza is benign and wants to bring in metal and concrete, not to build underground terror tunnels, but rather hospitals and schools.
As to a reduction of territory, on this matter there may be some disagreement between Israel and the US down the road. Israeli officials have spoken of the need to carve out a narrow buffer zone all along the border inside Gaza to prevent a recurrence of the situation where terrorists are positioned literally just meters away from Israeli communities.
No more terrorism in Gaza
As to the fifth point—that Gaza should not become a platform for terrorism—that is something Israel obviously agrees with 100%.
Where things get dicey is where Harris went from these five points: “We want to see a unified Gaza and West Bank under the Palestinian Authority.”
She then expanded on this: “The Palestinian Authority security forces must be strengthened to eventually assume security responsibilities in Gaza,” she said. “The Palestinian Authority must be revitalized, driven by the will of the Palestinian people, which will allow them to benefit from the rule of law and a transparent responsible government. Eventually, this revitalized Palestinian Authority must have the capacity to govern Gaza as well as the West Bank.”
Harris used language here that US officials have been using consistently over the last few weeks: a “revitalized Palestinian Authority,” without giving any indication of what that means practically. In their public comments, US officials tend to romanticize the PA—present it as a good-willed, peace-loving entity that just wants to live side by side with Israel in two states.
Netanyahu, in a press conference Saturday night, was unequivocal in stating that there was no way he would ever agree to the Palestinian Authority given control of Gaza, saying that Israel will not ignore or whitewash the PA’s enormous failings.
“We recognize all the bad things that come from the PA, and we don’t ignore them,” he said.
Among the “bad things” he enumerated were that the PA pays terrorists in jail for killing or trying to kill Jews; that they educate their children to a hatred of Israel, a desire to kill Jews and bring about Israel’s disappearance; that PA President Mahmoud Abbas, more than 50 days after the October 7 massacre, has yet to apologize; and that PA Leader Jabril Rajoub said that he hopes to see what happened on October 7 unfold from the West Bank as well.
Netanyahu said that the creation of the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo Agreement was a “horrible mistake” that took the most hostile elements within the Arab world and Palestinian society and transplanted them into the heart of Israel. “One thing I will not do,” he said, is take this “flawed thing” and put it in control of Gaza.
Acknowledging that this is “what some of our best friends recommend,” Netanyahu said, “I think differently.”
“I think we will have to create something different,” he said of Gaza the day after the war, adding that Israel will need to retain overall security control and that the internal administration “will have to be through a completely different process, as the PA has failed in this.” Regarding the PA, Netanyahu said, “It doesn’t fight terrorism, it funds terror; it doesn’t educate toward peace, it educates toward Israel’s disappearance. That is not the entity that needs to take control of Gaza.”
The differences between the US and Israel on this matter could not be more stark: Harris and the US administration see the PA as part of the solution; Israel sees it as a major part of the problem.
The key to bridging the gap—and it is a considerable one—may be in the definition of that word that the US is now using in talking about the PA: “revitalized.” If a “revitalized” PA means a wholly revamped and restructured PA, with new leaders, new policies, new textbooks, and hands-on input from countries like the United Arab Emirates rather than Qatar, then that is one thing.
If, however, it means just pouring old wine into a new bottle, then — at the risk of conflating this into a full-blown diplomatic crisis over the issue, as some will breathlessly want to portray it — just say the two countries are on a non-catastrophic collision course over this specific issue.
This week, a special tour group of Knesset members is expected to visit various schools in east Jerusalem as part of the work of the ‘Subcommittee for Curricula in east Jerusalem and Their Supervision’ headed by MK Avichai Boaron of Likud. Due to security and political sensitivities, only subcommittee members will be allowed to participate in the visit under heavy security.
During the visit, Knesset members will be able to discuss and meet face-to-face with relevant factors in the education system, learn about existing challenges and opportunities, and examine ways to improve and enhance learning and teaching processes to meet the government’s targets for transitioning students from Palestinian to Israeli curricula.
MK Boaron emphasized that the visit is intended to allow Knesset members to get a firsthand impression of what’s happening in East Jerusalem schools and to formulate an up-to-date and accurate picture that will serve as a basis for promoting wise and effective policy in the field of education in the eastern part of the city.
Boaron added, “The subcommittee under my leadership is committed to working to improve the quality of education in East Jerusalem, while ensuring quality curricula adapted to the needs of the students. We believe that education is the key to integration and advancement of society in the eastern part of the city, and we will do everything in our power to ensure that every student gets the opportunity to realize their potential.”In a discussion held a few days ago in the Education Committee’s subcommittee, the data behind the government’s decision regarding education in East Jerusalem was revealed, budgeted at one billion NIS, and far from meeting its goals.
The committee’s findings
The committee also revealed that 6000 out of 6700 teachers were trained in the Palestinian Authority, and 85 percent of schools (over 90,000 out of 110,000 students) still study the Palestinian Authority’s curriculum.
The data also showed that close to 200 million NIS from the amount allocated for this matter in the government’s decision were invested in the program. Still, only 2000 students have transitioned in the last two years from the Palestinian program to the Israeli program. In fact, the State of Israel invests one million NIS to transition a student in East Jerusalem from the Palestinian program to the Israeli one.
In the discussion ahead of the special tour, Boaron said, “This committee was established to deal with a problem that is nothing less than a powder keg placed in the heart of Jerusalem, the capital city of the State of Israel. Before we go to ‘de-Nazify’ the students of the Gaza Strip, we must examine the learning content here in Jerusalem. After many years under the minister’s leadership, incitement content was removed from the learning materials. In parallel, about a year and a half ago, the minister led a government decision to replace the Palestinian curriculum with an Israeli curriculum. This decision is good and important. However, this decision did not bring about the desired change – east Jerusalem residents are not interested in adopting the Israeli curriculum, and the teachers themselves are not willing to teach the program.”
“My colleagues and I will do everything to change this delusional reality. This intolerable situation cannot continue.” He continued.
“The latest government decision on this issue speaks of slow and gradual treatment of the problem before us, but this is a big mistake. The treatment of this problem must be sharp and quick. In the coming months, if the situation does not change significantly for the better, I will turn to the Prime Minister and recommend canceling the government’s decision on the matter and making a completely different decision. We need to deal with the complex problems existing in the current education of east Jerusalem students in a much more stubborn and severe manner than what is happening today. The committee’s discussions help us understand the scope of the problem and its severity and decide on the best tools to deal with its correction.”
Following that discussion, MK Boaron sent a letter to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Education, and other officials to share the data and conclusions and even proposed an innovative idea to examine cooperation with Arab countries and connect them to the education system in east Jerusalem.
“Education in east Jerusalem is a national event, no less.” MK Boaron concluded, “And that’s how it should be treated, with seriousness and gravity. For decades we have allowed this bomb to grow quietly and without interference, with God’s help we intend to study the issue in depth, and lead significant processes in the matter together with all the factors, the existing situation must change.”
There is no question about it: Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar has trapped somebody – the only question is whom? Has he trapped Israel into falling clumsily into the regional war that he always wanted on October 7, with all of the negatives that entails?
Or has he trapped Iran, and its main proxy Hezbollah, into prematurely wasting their great moments, capabilities, and threats to aid Sinwar’s lost cause in Gaza, instead of reserving them to deter Jerusalem from attacking Iran’s nuclear program?
Going back in time, Sinwar’s calculation – until now, miscalculation – was that if he invaded southern Israel, Hezbollah, Iran, Yemen, Syrian militias, West Bank terrorists, and Arab Israelis would all join in.
In his best-case scenario, Hezbollah would have invaded Israel’s northern villages just as Hamas was invading the South, providing a one-two punch that would have confused and paralyzed the IDF even more than it was from Hamas’s stunningly successful initial thrust.It also would have rocketed large portions of Israel to create further chaos and disorder and put Israelthe Jewish state on the defensive.
Instead, Hezbollah sufficed with a mostly symbolic (at a strategic level) string of rocket and drone attacks on only on Israel’s villages and cities located very close to the border.
At the earliest stages, Hezbollah did not attack the Golan Heights or places like Safed, Acre, or Nahariya.
Yemen never joined in anything more than a sporadic way and onwith a significant delay.
Iran neverdidn’t joined until April, and since then has mostly remained on the sidelines.
The other fronts have been quiet or nonstrategic factors.
But maybe after waiting 11 months, Sinwar could have trapped Israel into picking a larger fight with Hezbollah, which could finally bring Hezbollah, Iranthe Lebanese-based terrorist group, its Iranian sponsor, and others into the war in a more full-fledged fashion.
Sinwar also hoped to delay or end the trend of Israeli normalization with moderate Sunni Arab countries, such as with the Saudis, which seemed imminent in September 2023.
LastLastly, he hoped to undermine Israel’s alliances with the US, UK, and EU, and to get Israel in trouble with international courts.
In turn, this could lead Israel to finally agree to his terms of allowing Hamas to remain in power and to releasing massive numbers of Palestinian security prisoners. He could then be seen as the new Palestinian “Saladin” of the 21st century – the man who brought Israel to its knees and forced it to recognize Hamas.
This is no fantasy.
Normalization with the Saudis has been delayed, alliances with the West have been frayed, and international courts are after Israel in an unprecedented fashion, even as compared to prior wars.
The unanswered dilemma is who will come out on top in the escalating conflict with Hezbollah.
If Hezbollah manages to harm Israel enough with its rocket arsenal or outlast Jerusalem enough to force improved ceasefire terms for itself and Hamas, Sinwar’s trap will have succeeded, albeit with an 11-month delay.
But this is far from the most likely scenario.
Since last Tuesday, Hezbollah has been battered and pummeled in ways it never expected.
The Lebanese terror group has lost 3,000-4,000 fighters, its Radwan commander Ibrahim Aqil and 13-15 of his subordinate commanders, more than 500 rocket launchers, and many thousands of rockets.
What if the IDF at some point overcomes Hezbollah’s ability to swarm it with long-range precision rockets and enormous volumes of short-range rockets?
What if the IDF at some point achieves an overmatch capability against Hezbollah where its main threats against Israel are neutered, if not neutralized?
Shockingly, this might even be possible without an invasion.
Or what if the IDF manages an invasion of Lebanon without Hezbollah being able to destroy large stretches of the home front with its rocket arsenal juggernaut, as had always been predicted in worst-case scenarios?
The whole purpose of Hezbollah from Iran’s perspective, which provides its rocket arsenal, funding, and training, was to deter Israel from ever attacking Tehran’s nuclear facilities, lest it give up its ace in the hole.
What if Sinwar had led Hezbollah into a war it was not ready to fight, with the IDF achieving massive strategic surprise and suddenly degrading the Hezbollah threat to a point where it no longer served to deter the Jewish state from acting against Iran?
In that case, Sinwar’s trap will have boomeranged into undermining the head of the axis of Middle Eastern evil, Iran, as well as defanging its top proxy threat – Hezbollah.
He would then go down in history as not only the destroyer of Gaza but as the gambler who bungled decades of careful Iranian planning and put Israel in its strongest security position in years
Abd Al-Salam Haniyeh, the son of the killed Hamas terror leader Ismail Haniyeh, claimed in an August interview with SamaQuds that his father rejected the “deal of a century” which would have seen the establishment of Palestinian statehood, according to a translation by the Middle East Media Research Institute.
Haniyeh Jr. claimed that the deal would have allegedly seen billions invested into Gaza.
“May our hands be paralyzed if we sign an agreement which would separate Gaza from Palestine,” the Hamas leader has allegedly said in response to the proposed deal.
The deal would have also encompassed the disarmament of Hamas.
Haniyeh also claimed that media coverage of the 2008-2009 conflict also saw increased convoys entering the Gaza Strip, which led to more active construction of terror tunnels.
Rejecting statehood
The Palestinian leadership has rejected multiple deals that would see the establishment of Palestinian statehood. In 1936, the British offered the Peel Commission, which would have seen a separate Arab state but which was rejected by the Palestinian leadership, according to CIJA.
In 1948, Palestinian leadership rejected the Partition Plan, which also encompassed an opportunity for statehood. In 2000, under Prime Minister Ehud Barak, the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, again rejected an offer of statehood. Finally, as referenced by Haniyeh, in 2008, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas rejected a land-for-peace offer.
Hamas officials have continued to speak against a two-state solution in conversation with Arab media, insisting on a singular Arab nation.
Ismail Haniyeh
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in July while attending the inauguration of Iran’s new president in Tehran.
While Israel neither accepted nor denied responsibility for the attack, Iran has promised to retaliate.
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