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Israel-Hamas war: How a legendary IDF commando was killed on October 7
“We knew he went out on missions, of the type that the Shaldag [Unit] carries out, to bring intelligence from all kinds of places, but he didn’t talk about it and we didn’t know a great deal more than that,” Zeevik Rosenthal tells me as we sit on the sofa at his family’s well-appointed house in Mevaseret Zion. “Only after his death, we saw all sorts of medals and awards describing how he was in countless operations, and 550 people came to the funeral, mostly from the unit, all with similar stories… and suddenly you receive the full picture of who your son was.”
Zeevik’s son, Chief Warrant Officer Ido Rosenthal, was a legendary fighter of the Shaldag (Kingfisher) commando unit, one of the IDF’s most senior and classified units. He was killed on October 7 in the first hours of the Hamas rampage through the Gaza border communities.
Apparently on his own initiative, Ido left his home in Moshav Ben-Shemen and made his way to the Shaldag base. From there, together with a few comrades, he headed south. In the first chaotic hours following Hamas’s destruction of the border fence, with the official defense structures hardly functioning and the civilian communities largely without defense, he and his colleagues hurled themselves at the enemy. They were heavily outnumbered. They did not hesitate. The cost was high.
So I am at Zeevik’s house to try to piece together the events of that day and to explore a single one of the accounts by which, on October 7, official structures of Israel descended into chaos and dysfunction for a period of several deadly hours, and nonetheless individuals and small groups of Israelis stepped into the resultant void. And I want also to take a closer look at one of those individuals, not necessarily in order to generalize from the particular to the communal.We were joined at the house in Mevaseret by Ido’s sister, Noa Ziv. The portrait of Ido that emerges, as we sift through the photos and documents that Zeevik places on the table in front of us, is of a singular and very far from ordinary man.
Ido Rosenthal in the IDF
A regular soldier, Ido Rosenthal spent the greater part of his adult working life as a fighter of the Shaldag Unit. So we should begin by understanding a little about this unique and most discreet of Israeli military formations.
Nothing much exists officially with regard to it. Its veterans, like Ido, don’t tend to go into detail. Nevertheless, a fair amount of general information can be gathered.
Formed in 1974 by colonel Muki Betser, the unit was initially intended to specialize in forward air control. Today it has moved far beyond that function. Now it specializes in long-range penetration deep inside hostile territory, special operations, and reconnaissance inside enemy areas, often related to intelligence-gathering tasks. From its beginnings as a reserve company of the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit, it is now operated from within the Israeli Air Force.
“Shaldag’s mission as forward air controllers is only their rather outdated and official task,” a former Military Intelligence officer of my acquaintance tells me. “They are an integral part of every war and major operation.”
As to the precise nature of the actions in which Ido took part, it’s not possible to say. But among the very long list of operations that are associated with this small unit during the period of his service, according to unofficial sources, are Operation Orchard, the mission to destroy the Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007; and Operation Sharp and Smooth, a successful raid on Baalbek in southern Lebanon during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. In the former operation, according to the Sunday Times, Shaldag fighters, operating on the ground in Syria, carried out their classic role of identifying targets for aircraft, and infiltrating and marking a depot adjoining the plutonium reactor under construction at al-Kibar.
Shaldag is one of the very top tier of Israel’s special forces units. It shares this distinction with the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit; Shayetet 13, the naval commandos; and Unit 669, the airborne rescue unit. This is the environment in which Ido spent his working life, with breaks to study visual communications at Hadassah Academic College in Jerusalem, and to travel. And to raise three children with his partner, Noga, in Ben-Shemen.
Ido Rosenthal, the man
Ido loved nature, hiking, and hard traveling. “He went once from Mongolia to China on a motorcycle, all the way across China and to Thailand – 3,500 km. on a motorbike,” Zeevik tells me.
Ido was of Hungarian and Iraqi Jewish origin, and grew up in Jerusalem. As a young man in his early 20s, already four or five years into service in Shaldag, he sometimes used to come out to the city’s music bars, to have a beer and meet with friends. I was a part of that scene, too, about 20 years ago, and he and I had a number of mutual friends. I even remember him from those days, as I told Zeevik and Noa.
What I chiefly remember about him (which I didn’t tell them) was a sort of contrast.
On the one hand, I remember that Ido had an unmistakable physical presence. That is, he was very obviously an unusually tough man, with an easy fluency about his movements suggesting supreme physical fitness.
On the other hand, there was absolutely nothing assumed or pretentious about any of this. He did not refer to his military service, had no interest in conveying any image, still less any aura of mystery, and he liked talking to people about all the things people who gathered in those places liked to talk about – music, beer, sometimes history and politics, as I remember. No arrogance or nonsense about him.
I only spoke to him a couple of times and don’t claim to have known him or to have been his friend. Ido’s cousin, however, Ziv Adika, with whom he was very close, is a good friend of mine from those days. Ziv played the bass in a Jerusalem punk band that was well known around those times. Ido used to go to their concerts when he was home on leave.
“I gave him a poster of Crass [a well-known British anarchist punk band from the 1980s] once,” Ziv tells me as we sit in his apartment in central Jerusalem. “You remember that one, with the dead guy’s hand and the message ‘Your country needs you’? Ido stuck it up at the Shaldag HQ, but they made him take it down.” We laugh. “But they loved him there, you know? And because he was so good at what he did, like 100% and a lot more, they let him get away with those things.
“He never had fear. Of Anything. As kids in Ramot and the German Colony we used to jump off roofs, over fences, and he was just without fear. There are people like that, right?”
So it would seem. The following is an account of Ido’s activities on the morning of October 7 as related to me by his father and sister, who in turn base it on many conversations with comrades from Ido’s unit.
October 7
On that morning, at just after 8 a.m., having become aware of the events in the South, Ido left his home in Ben-Shemen. He made his way to the Shaldag base, somewhere in central Israel. At the base, the unit maintains a number of helicopters fully equipped for emergency response. Other fighters had already begun to gather there. Ido was assigned to a four-man team, led by the Shaldag deputy commander. He was the No. 2 in this hastily assembled group. They boarded the helicopter after equipping themselves for action and receiving weapons. They took off around 9:30 a.m. The helicopter landed at Kfar Maimon.
Shaldag’s helicopters are loaded with small, rough-terrain vehicles which the unit uses to travel across hostile territory on its deep penetration missions. The four fighters boarded one of these and began to head in the direction of Kibbutz Be’eri. Hamas had already entered the kibbutz and were in the midst of slaughtering its inhabitants.
On the road, the Shaldag men came across a lone Hamas terrorist. They killed him in the short exchange of fire that followed.
Arriving at an IDF position, they were told by the officer commanding there that they could go no further. “Ahead of here there’s areas containing and controlled by terrorists,” he told them.
“That’s what we came for,” the commander of the Shaldag force replied, and they continued on their way.
Somewhere in the course of all this, they had picked up another two reserve fighters, so the team now numbered six.
Arriving close to Be’eri, the team identified a large group of around 30 Hamas terrorists making their way across the open ground from Be’eri in the direction of Kibbutz Alumim. The Shaldag men decided to engage. Exiting the vehicle, they left two fighters next to it as a rescue force if needed. Four, including Ido, went forward, advancing as an infantry section across the open ground.
At the appropriate distance, the four charged the group of 30, opening fire. Around 10 of the terrorists were killed in this first attack, with the remainder taking shelter behind some sand dunes in the open ground. A firefight ensued. One of the terrorists managed to get to the side of the Israeli force and opened fire. The first of the Shaldag men was wounded. A round went through his hand, penetrated his ceramic vest and then remained between the vest and his chest. The soldier, seeing the blood spreading from his hand, assumed he was dying. Ido reached him, assessed the situation, and said that he would be okay, telling him to crawl back in the direction of the vehicle.
Making his way back to the vehicle, around a minute later the wounded soldier heard a long burst of automatic fire. This, it appears, was the burst that killed Ido, a bullet entering his neck, and wounded the commander of the team, the deputy commander of Shaldag. The two remaining members of the force pulled back, with Ido’s body.
The commander noted that the 20 or so remaining terrorists remained hidden behind the dunes, evidently looking to continue the firefight. He managed to radio back and called for a helicopter gunship, which arrived after a few minutes, wiping out the remaining Hamas men.
“And that’s it, that’s the story,” Zeevik tells me in Mevaseret Zion. “So, because of their action, they saved Kibbutz Alumim. The group [of terrorists] that was supposed to go to Alumim didn’t get there. Ten killed by Ido’s group, and the remainder by the helicopter crew. And as a result, the community was saved.”
His family speaks
We talked a while longer. More anecdotes, more memories. For example, the time that Ido, most unusually, had asked his mother to iron his class A uniform. “There’s some ceremonial army event,” he had remarked when asked the reason. And only years after, they discovered by chance that he had needed the uniform to receive the Israel Security Prize, a major citation, from then-defense minister Avigdor Liberman.
And the family gathering they had on Friday, October 6, when Zeevik and his brother-in-law, both combat veterans, had reminisced and argued about the positions along the Suez Canal prior to the 1973 war, and Ido had gathered all the family’s kids for a game of soccer as he liked to do.
“I accept all of it, and I don’t have any complaints about the specific situation that Ido came to,” Zeevik tells me, by way of parting. “He was a fighter… Ido went to save civilians. That was his profession, and he loved what he did.”
And his cousin Adika said something similar. “I used to say to him, ‘Enough already. You’ve done your part.’ But he died as he would have wanted to have died, in battle, not, I dunno, aged 70, of cancer, you know?” And then, by way of conclusion: “They didn’t bury him on Mount Herzl. Noga didn’t want that. He’s buried in a place next to Ben-Shemen. In a place of trees and nature, like he loved.”
Piecing it together
I have seen some camera footage of the Shaldag men operating around Kibbutz Be’eri. One should not imagine them as a hastily assembled, improvised force. They came in from their base in helicopters, properly equipped. They look like what they were: highly trained special forces operators moving with speed and effect.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that for many hours on October 7, the security structures of the State of Israel largely disappeared, effectively ceased to function. Ido Rosenthal was one of the small group of fighters, men and women, who stepped into the breach and chose to bear the burden and the heat of the day.
Even after they arrived at Kfar Maimon, the Shaldag men could have chosen to wait at the first position they reached for orders from somewhere or other above. Even after they continued forward, they could have assessed that the 30-strong force ahead was too numerous to engage and waited for assistance. They didn’t. They chose to go forward. Five hundred and thirty people – men, women, and children at Kibbutz Alumim – were saved. But Ido Rosenthal was killed.
May his memory be a blessing.
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The United Nations called the situation in northern Gaza “desperate” on Monday, sparking renewed criticism of Israel a year after it launched a major offensive against Hamas.
The Israeli military issued evacuation orders for northern Gaza, citing intelligence that Hamas was regrouping. This followed an offensive on the Jabaliya refugee camp.
Residents were urged to relocate to humanitarian safe zones. However, reports suggest that many have not followed the orders, likely due to exhaustion from repeated displacement throughout the year-long war. The UN estimates nearly 2 million Palestinians have been displaced, many forced to move as the Israeli army withdraws and re-enters various parts of the territory.
Humanitarian aid to Gaza, largely controlled by Israel through its oversight of all entry points, has been a contentious issue within Israel since the war began in October last year, drawing international scrutiny and criticism.
Israeli media reports that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is considering “The General’s Plan,” proposed by retired army generals. The plan calls for halting humanitarian aid to northern Gaza to increase pressure on Hamas and secure the release of 101 Israeli hostages. It assumes that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has not relented under the yearlong military campaign and suggests that withholding aid might force the desired outcome. The plan also proposes indefinite Israeli military control of the area. Netanyahu has denied any intention to permanently control or resettle Gaza, which Israel evacuated in 2005.
“What we are seeing seems like either an attempt to implement the first part of the plan, or a trial run of it,” Michael Milstein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, told The Media Line. “But the Palestinian population is not cooperating, and it doesn’t seem to be working,” Milstein added. “It is unclear how such a plan will promote Israel’s goals. “The plan seeks to completely clear the area of civilians. Any who remain would be considered combatants by the Israeli army, allowing troops to engage them. The army has declined to comment on whether it is following this plan or acting under other orders.
“The Hamas terrorist organization uses the residents of Gaza as human shields and prevents them from obeying IDF calls to move to safe areas,” Lt. Col. Avichay Adraee, the Israel Defense Forces’ Arabic spokesperson, posted on X Monday, blaming Hamas for the lack of civilian cooperation.
Preventing Hamas from regrouping
The army’s latest move to reposition in Gaza is part of ongoing efforts to prevent Hamas from rebuilding. Following an intense ground operation early in the war, the IDF has significantly reduced its presence, with relatively few troops now stationed in Gaza. “This represents a moment of strategic embarrassment,” said Milstein. “Israel has been at an intersection for a long time without making a decision. The doctrine in which it believed it could topple Hamas without 24/7 occupation of Gaza is a failed one.”
With its forces engaged in a war against Hezbollah in Lebanon and possibly facing an imminent confrontation with Iran, the Israeli military is likely too stretched to maintain a larger presence in Gaza.
“This leaves no other option than to make a deal with Hamas, that would see an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the release of hostages,” said Milstein. The IDF controls several areas in Gaza, while leaving others under Hamas’ control. Israel forces are present at Gaza’s border with Egypt, the perimeter along the Gaza Strip, and in the northern part of the territory.
Hard-liners in the Israeli government are advocating for a full occupation of the Gaza Strip, while Israel faces mounting criticism over the humanitarian situation in the impoverished territory.
“The UN reports that no food has entered northern Gaza in nearly 2 weeks. Israel must urgently do more to facilitate the flow of aid to those in need. Civilians must be protected and must have access to food, water, and medicine. International humanitarian law must be respected,” US Vice President and Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris posted on X Monday.
The IDF Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories reported that 83 trucks carrying humanitarian aid and 12 gas and fuel tankers entered Gaza on Monday. The war between Hamas and Israel began after Hamas launched a large-scale attack on southern Israel. The assault, which shocked the nation, left 1,200 Israelis dead, thousands injured, and over 250 taken hostage. Since the war began, 154 hostages have been released, some of them deceased. The fate of the remaining hostages remains unclear, with dozens believed to be dead.
UNOCHA figures, based on reports from the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry, indicate that over 42,000 Palestinians have been killed since the war began. While Israel asserts that many of the casualties were armed combatants, international and Palestinian sources report a high civilian death toll. These figures have not been independently verified but have nonetheless led to criticism of Israel’s conduct in the war.
As the war rages, Israel continues to pound Gaza in the hopes of achieving the two main goals its government has set for the war— toppling Hamas and securing the release of hostages. A year into the conflict, international organizations have consistently warned that Gaza is on the brink of famine. Israel, however, denies any threat to food security, insisting that it maintains a steady flow of humanitarian aid into the territory. Some Israelis have advocated using humanitarian aid as leverage to pressure Hamas, which currently controls its distribution, thereby maintaining its grip on Gaza. Several Israeli officials have suggested that prominent Gaza families or clans could govern the territory instead of Hamas. However, the Israeli government has ruled out reinstalling the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a replacement, citing its support for terrorism and its failure to condemn the October 7 attack on Israel.
“If Palestinians had to choose between Hamas or Gazan clans to rule Gaza, they would choose Hamas,” Mkhaimar Abusada, chairman of the Department of Political Science at Al-Azhar University in Gaza and visiting scholar at Northwestern University, told The Media Line. “If Israel would allow the PA to run Gaza again, the goal of marginalizing Hamas will be easier. One must keep in mind that the PA would not step foot in Gaza without Hamas’ approval.”
“The Israeli army, which has killed over 42,000 Palestinians, is not trusted by Gazans to distribute aid,” Abusada added. “The overwhelming majority of them look at the Israeli army as murderers and they will not accept food from them.” However, if left with no other option, Gazans may be forced to accept aid from the Israeli army.
“There is no competition for Hamas in Gaza,” said Milstein. “They continue to control the area, through civilian governance. They survived Israel’s massive offensive and are still the dominant force in Gaza, they survived by being like chameleons successfully changing constantly. Without a full occupation, this will not disappear despite Israel trying to make it so.”
Hamas ousted the PA from Gaza in 2007. Violent images of Hamas fighters throwing PA employees from rooftops in Gaza City highlighted the deep animosity between the two rival Palestinian factions. Years of reconciliation efforts have failed, despite repeated claims to the contrary. However, recent negotiations in Cairo have reportedly brought the two sides closer to an agreement on postwar Gaza.
“Hamas has accepted in principle to allow the PA to run the Gaza Strip, they have still now agreed that Hamas is more open to this scenario,” Abusada said.
The likelihood of this scenario remains slim, due to a complex set of circumstances that have significantly weakened the PA over the past decade. With Hamas still in power in Gaza and the Israeli military stretched too thin to remove them, humanitarian aid remains at the heart of the conflict. With no signs of a ceasefire on the horizon, civilians will continue to pay the price.
Michael Bar Zohar, at 86 one of Israel’s great and most prolific historians, especially regarding security issues, published a book called “Iron Swords, Bleeding Hearts” less than a month ago on the failures leading up to October 7 and the current war.
The book closes just as Hezbollah is considering its response to the IDF’s killing of its military chief Fuad Shukr on July 30, which turned out to be the August 25 IDF rout of Hezbollah’s attempted retaliation, which itself in turn pushed Israel into having the audacity to decapitate Hezbollah starting in mid-September.
Bar Zohar uses essentially all open sources on the most current events, but has a priceless number of anecdotes and unique perspectives from his exclusive coverage of Israeli titans like David Ben Gurion, Shimon Peres, and others as he leads into how Israel and the Middle East got to where they are now.
But the most important aspects of Bar Zohar’s book are forward-looking: How must Israel, and the West for that matter, understand the challenge of fundamentalist Islamist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran?With the anniversary of Hamas’s October 7 invasion passing this past week and the invasion of Lebanon moving forward at full throttle, the most practical lessons from Bar Zohar probably have to do with connecting those two events in terms of understanding how the current war in Lebanon must end.
Extrapolating from Bar Zohar’s narrative, predictions, and views, the war in Lebanon must end with Israeli security being dependent on Jerusalem and its allies being able to enforce its security and not merely on hopes of “converting” Hezbollah into accepting Israel and joining the Western world.
Bar Zohar writes, “I began writing this book on October 8, 2023, after a sleepless night. I had turned off my TV set after watching, on a foreign channel, the horror in the settlements at the Gaza border, and, for a change, the boisterous street protests in favor of Hamas in foreign capitals.”
“I knew that this crucial chapter of history would be distorted and falsified by lies and fake news, as well as emotions, blind fanaticism, insane hatred of some and foolish adoration of others. I felt that my duty was to tell the truth about these apocalyptic events that shook the world. But to tell the truth now, today, not in a year or two or five. Now.” he continues.
Here, Bar Zohar was cognizant that October 7 was not just about killing 1,200 Israelis, taking 250 hostages, and the failures that led to this – but how this event and Israel’s response would reshape the Middle East afterward.
Failures that lead to October 7
Aside from a harrowing account of the numerous political, intelligence, and operational failures leading into October 7 which are meticulously laid out in the first 16 chapters, there are some later chapters which paint some of the broader trends which have developed since November 2023 and still confront Israel now.
His coverage of Israel’s first major assassination in Lebanon on January 2, 2024 – of Hamas deputy chief Salah al-Arouri – is indicative.
Recounting the event, he says, “Sheik Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, took Al Arouri’s assassination very seriously. Only a few days before, he had met with Arouri and advised him to beware, as the Israelis targeted him. For Nasrallah, the location of the hit was symbolic. During the Second Lebanon War, Israeli warplanes had pulverized the Dahia neighborhood, where the headquarters of Hezbollah were located.”
With a bit of unforeseeable irony and almost prophetic foreshadowing for how Nasrallah eventually met his end from an IDF air strike in Dahia on September 27, Bar Zohar continues. “Nasrallah himself had to run for shelter to an underground bunker in Dahia. After the war ended [referring to the 2006 Second Lebanon War], he stayed in his bunker for years, avoiding any public appearances. Even his speeches were broadcast from the bunker. He thought he was safe in Dahia – and here [after Al Arouri was killed], all of a sudden, he found out that Israel could readily come and go as it pleased. If Arouri was not safe there, neither was Nasrallah. The assassination also proved that Israel had very reliable spies in Beirut.”
Bar Zohar recounts how Nasrallah was taken by surprise when the IDF killed Al Arouri as well as a few days later when the IDF killed Wissam Al Tawil, the deputy commander of the elite Radwan unit, with Al Tawil also being the brother of Nasrallah’s third wife, Hadda Al Tawil.
Nasrallah struck back at some IDF bases in the North, but without causing significant damage and in a relatively weak way, with Bar Zohar commenting, “These Hezbollah attacks were very close to acts of war, but did not cross the blurred line between a border conflict and a war…But once again the upshot failed to meet expectations,” for what Hamas had hoped for from Hezbollah in helping them fight Israel.
The bottom line is that, as indicated by these earlier rounds, once Israel switched gears into hitting Nasrallah much more complicated, he was not ready for the IDF’s fury and was taken by surprise – much as he had been by Hamas’s invasion on October 7.
Next, Bar Zohar briefly explores in one of his last chapters the implications of the Iranian attack, the Israeli counterattack, and the help Israel received from Sunni allies to defend itself in April.
He observes, “And yet, the most important result of these tumultuous days was the baptism of fire of the new American-Arab-Israeli coalition that augured a new era in the Middle East. A new era is indeed beginning, bringing tremendous changes to the lives of millions and carrying a faint glimmer of peace. The new coalition, strengthened by new Israeli leaders, may augur the creation of a new Middle East.”
“The coalition that defeated the Iranian juggernaut in the sky may transform into a solid alliance that could reshape the entire region, establish a new administration in Gaza, and bring moderation to these embattled lands. This is the dream for the future,” he continues.
But by the end of the book, Bar Zohar notes that the killing of Shukr, as well as the killing of Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, were “the start of a new stage in the war, with the focus moving from the Gaza strip to the North. That seemed to be the fading away of the Iron Swords and the beginning of a new confrontation between Israel, America, and their allies – and the ‘Axis of Evil’ in the north.
In terms of how the conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran should end, he warns that military force will be continually needed alongside any diplomatic efforts and cautions not to leave too much based on “deals” with such parties.
“One can reason with extremists as long as they understand logic and have a modicum of common sense. Israel could negotiate with the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, and his supporters, as their movement, Fatah, was a nationalist, not a religious one. But when the rival’s ideology is based on religion – no reasonable arguments can influence it,” writes Bar Zohar.
Although Bar Zohar was formerly a Labor party member and Arafat was far from an ideal peace partner, his book’s conclusion is clear that any final security situation with Hezbollah and Iran must be enforceable by the Israeli military.
A diplomatic deal may end the conflict as all conflicts end, but after seeing how Hezbollah abused UN Resolution 1701 for 17 years, Bar Zohar clearly feels that resolving the current conflict with Hezbollah cannot rest merely on an, even strengthened, international peacekeeping force hopefully doing its job.
He finishes with a dark prediction that “The Israel-Hamas confrontation is the first battle of a new World War, a war between the modern world and the ferocious fanatics of radical Islam. A new kind of war. Not the wars to which the world has grown accustomed, fought with armies, tanks, planes, and infantry firing and charging and shouting Hurray – but a war against enemies who aim to destroy the free world from within.”
Special forces killed four terrorists in a vehicle during an operation in Nablus in the West Bank, army radio reported on X/Twitter Wednesday evening.
They were seen armed moments before they were killed, footage published by army radio showed.
A source told Kan that the terrorists killed in Nablus were a squad of terrorists from the Balata Camp that were preparing to carry out an attack against Israelis.4 מחבלים חוסלו ברכב במהלך פעולה של כוחות מיוחדים בשכם, כך הם תועדו רגע לפני שנהרגו pic.twitter.com/mFUGTHFqYg
— הוד בראל Hod Barel (@hod_barel) October 9, 2024
Riots in Nablus
Riots broke out on Wednesday afternoon, during which the IDF killed four terrorists following intelligence provided by the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), Maariv reported.
Commander of the Balata Battalion of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade (which is aligned with Fatah) Issam a-Salaj was allegedly eliminated in the operation, Walla noted.
This is a developing story.
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