world news
The hidden dangers for soldiers on the social media battlefield – analysis
A photo of Yossi on a family vacation in Cyprus would not normally raise an eyebrow. But for Hamas and other terrorist groups, it serves as a locator and a potential weapon of war. In today’s world, where images posted on social media can be accessed and analyzed by anyone with an internet connection, the ramifications of soldiers sharing details of their service are profound.
Despite strict regulations implemented by militaries, many soldiers share details of their service, especially in this era of instant news and social media. These bragging rights jeopardize not only the safety of the soldier posting images but also that of fellow troops and their families.
These digital footprints—ranging from a soldier taking selfies in uniform, to snapshots posted from the field—can fall into the hands of adversaries. The implications are not limited to immediate physical danger but extend to legal vulnerability, as seen in the experience of Israeli officials facing war crime accusations by the International Criminal Court (ICC). In this climate,
Hamas operatives or other hostile groups can take advantage of open-source intelligence to pinpoint soldiers and potentially have them arrested should they travel abroad.
Israel has felt the sting of these tactics firsthand. Recent examples demonstrate how sharing images and posts online can expose soldiers to significant risks, including legal jeopardy and personal harassment.
Hind Rajab Foundation’s attempted lawfare
The Hind Rajab Foundation has tracked former IDF soldiers through social media to support legal complaints in countries like Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Thailand, accusing them of war crimes during the Gaza war. For instance, social media posts and geolocation data led to lawsuits against Saar Hirshoren, whose travels in South America have prompted legal action in both Argentina and Chile.
Similarly, Yuval Vagdani, an Israeli soldier vacationing in Brazil, fled the country—first to Argentina and then to Israel, via the United States—after social media evidence was used to initiate a war crimes investigation. The foundation, leveraging soldiers’ online content, has also filed complaints with the ICC, targeting entire military units for alleged crimes such as the destruction of civilian infrastructure.
These cases illustrate how public online activity can be weaponized to hold soldiers accountable under international law, emphasizing the broader implications of digital exposure for military personnel.
The Media Line was among the first agencies to speak with soldiers who reported being stalked online by Hamas-affiliated websites that collect and repost their personal information for malicious purposes. Scenes of soldiers taking selfies as buildings burn behind them in the heart of Gaza or as they move into private homes have emerged as damning evidence in the eyes of those seeking to brand Israeli forces as perpetrators of alleged war crimes.
In one incident, an IDF reservist who had posted photos online discovered that these images ended up on a Telegram channel named “Israel Genocide Tracker.” He quickly changed his privacy settings so that no unknown accounts could access his photos. He told The Media Line, “My page was public beforehand. But the information they posted about me is not accurate. Much of it is lies. The same goes for friends of mine.”
That soldier also acknowledged a grim new reality: “I guess it might not be a good idea to travel to Europe anytime soon.” He explained that he and other soldiers were instructed at the beginning of the war not to post pictures in real time. They could share them afterward only if the exact location was not clear. Still, as he put it, “even though this is forbidden, the army knows there is no real way to prevent it from happening.”
Another IDF soldier noted the difficulty of enforcement: “We may have been told not to post things. But our commanding officers themselves were taking pictures right along with us.” This discrepancy between official policy and individual behavior undermines security measures and highlights how easily operational guidelines can be flouted.
Part of the danger is the sheer scale and sophistication of online surveillance. The Middle East Spectator Telegram channel claims to have compiled names and contact information of 35,000 Israeli soldiers and Mossad intelligence agents. Such vast troves of data enable hostile actors to locate their targets, potentially applying universal jurisdiction to prosecute individuals they identify for alleged war crimes.
This is not a problem unique to Israel. The US and other countries face comparable challenges, forcing their militaries to adopt policies and educate service members about the risks of a casual social media post.US military personnel are permitted to share photos of themselves in uniform and aspects of their duties on social media, provided they follow guidelines to maintain operational security and uphold the integrity of the armed forces.
The Department of Defense (DoD) emphasizes the avoidance of posting sensitive details about deployments, troop movements, and other classified operations. Soldiers must ensure that their posts do not imply official endorsement or compromise the mission. Army guidelines, for example, instruct personnel to clearly distinguish personal accounts from official ones. Similarly, the DoD’s overarching social media policy, DoD Instruction 5400.17, urges familiarity with both DoD-wide and branch-specific policies.
These rules, while useful, are often challenging to enforce consistently. One US soldier, Sgt. 1st Class Michael Miller of the 198th Infantry Brigade, who conducted a Facebook Live town hall, cited army regulations to support the idea that social media can keep soldiers and families informed without sacrificing military bearing.
The US approach tries to strike a balance, acknowledging that sharing experiences with loved ones can alleviate the anxieties of war, but recognizing that malicious actors can easily exploit these channels for harmful ends.
What makes this threat all the more potent is the rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) tools. Advanced algorithms can analyze billions of images and connect the dots across social media platforms, surveillance footage, and other online sources.
Facial recognition tools powered by deep learning systems are no longer confined to science fiction. They can match images from disparate databases, aiding anyone—governments, terrorist groups, or cybercriminals—who wants to identify and track down a soldier.
Person re-identification systems break down a person’s appearance into unique features, allowing consistent identification even if the individual tries to remain inconspicuous. Combined with geolocation techniques, these AI-driven tools can effectively hunt down targets, eroding privacy and leaving service members vulnerable to harassment and legal jeopardy long after their service ends.
One measure that relates to protecting public servants’ personal information is “Daniel’s Law,” passed in New Jersey after a tragic attack on a US District Court judge’s family. Although this law specifically protects judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers by prohibiting the disclosure of their home addresses and certain other personal data, it stops short of addressing the distribution of facial images, which are considered public information.
Soldiers, like other public servants, can become high-value targets for hostile actors. While Daniel’s Law provides a layer of protection for certain information, it does not cover the online proliferation of facial images. In this sense, the law highlights both the importance of privacy protections and the limits of current legislation in curbing the dangers posed by AI-driven facial recognition.
Countries and their armed forces must face these challenges head-on. More sophisticated adversaries necessitate more stringent rules. The US is considering tighter operational security measures. US combat troops heading into war zones may have to leave personal devices behind, as personal electronics can become liabilities. Senior American commanders have begun to issue orders banning personal cellphones, laptops, and other devices during deployments.
All services are rethinking their approaches. For example, in 2020, the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division forbade its paratroopers from carrying personal devices on a deployment to the Middle East. The US Marine Corps recently banned the use of personal cell phones and other personal electronic devices during training exercises, armed duty, high-risk training, and aviation operations. Commanders will now have less leeway to decide policies; instead, Marines must follow a more uniform standard.
This reflects the broader realization that what worked during past conflicts, where insurgents lacked the technological savvy to exploit digital signatures, no longer suffices. Russia, China, Iran, and other state and non-state actors are far more adept at harvesting online intelligence from digital breadcrumbs that troops unwittingly leave behind.
The IDF faces a similar challenge. Israel is a small country with a conscript army, and soldiers frequently use social media to stay connected with civilian life. Yet the Israeli military is keenly aware of the risks and sets strict rules—albeit ones that can be hard to enforce in a force composed of young individuals raised in a digital world.
The Israeli approach, like the American one, involves educating troops about the dangers of social media. They instruct soldiers not to post real-time information, avoid giving away exact locations, and not to share certain details of their missions. Yet, as evidenced by the current war in Gaza, where Hamas operatives have exploited soldiers’ online footprints, the line between official policy and actual practice remains blurred.
Looking beyond Israel and the US, other militaries have also begun implementing strict security measures. Across the globe, forces now understand that a social media post is not just a harmless act of self-expression. It can provide intelligence to adversaries, feed into narratives that accuse soldiers of human rights violations, and open up legal vulnerabilities as international laws and tribunals gain prominence.
Training and strict disciplinary measures are essential but not always sufficient. Technological countermeasures, better encryption, and secure internal messaging systems are also needed.
The speed of modern warfare and the sophistication of AI-driven surveillance mean that a single impulsive post can jeopardize not only the individual who posted it, but the mission, their comrades, and the broader strategic goals of their military.
The evolving digital landscape, coupled with efforts like Daniel’s Law (and its limitations), shows that societies are grappling with how to protect those who serve. Yet the gap between legislation, official directives, and the messy reality of digital behavior remains wide.
Ultimately, the message is clear: When soldiers post photos of themselves online, they are not just sharing a memory or a moment with friends and family. They are providing adversaries with critical information. Whether in Israel, the US, or anywhere else, militaries must redouble efforts to educate troops about the consequences of posting from war zones.
They must enforce rules strictly and consider broader measures to protect personal data, especially as AI makes it easier than ever to identify and track individuals. The stakes of this digital battlefield are high, and the margin for error is vanishingly small.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Egypt’s foreign minister on Tuesday it was important to ensure Hamas terrorists can never govern Gaza again, the State Department said, with their call coming after President Donald Trump suggested Egypt and Jordan should take more Palestinians.
Trump on Saturday floated a plan to “clean out” Gaza, where Israel’s war has killed tens of thousands and caused a humanitarian crisis, in comments that echoed long-standing Palestinian fears of being permanently driven from their homes.
The suggestion by Trump was not mentioned in the US State Department statement released on Tuesday after the call between Rubio and Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty.
Jordan and Egypt had pushed back over the weekend after Trump’s comments that they should take in Palestinians from Gaza. Asked if this was a temporary or long-term solution, Trump had said: “Could be either.”“He (Rubio) also reinforced the importance of holding Hamas accountable,” the State Department said after Tuesday’s call.
“The Secretary reiterated the importance of close cooperation to advance post-conflict planning to ensure Hamas can never govern Gaza or threaten Israel again.”
Context
Rubio held a call a day earlier with Jordan’s King Abdullah, and the US statement after that call, too, did not mention Trump’s remarks on Palestinian displacement.
The latest bloodshed in the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict was triggered on Oct. 7, 2023, when Palestinian Hamas terrorists attacked Israel, killing 1,200 and taking about 250 hostages, according to Israeli tallies.
An Israeli aircraft attacked in the Tulkarm area as part of an IDF and Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) joint operation, the military announced on Monday.
Later reports in Israeli media clarified that the airstrike occurred in the Nur a-Shams refugee camp.
Footage from the scene indicates that a car was destroyed, leading to an explosive fire with a pillar of smoke rising into the sky.
Two Palestinians were in the vehicle at the time of the airstrike, according to Palestinians quoted in Israeli media.The Palestinian Health Ministry reported that one of the passengers was killed and the other was moderately injured, according to Israeli media reports.
Wider context
This comes amid the IDF’s Operation Iron Wall, aiming to remove Palestinian terrorists from Jenin and the wider area.
The IDF began a wide-ranging operation on Palestinian terror in Jenin last Tuesday, killing several terrorists in the mission meant to last a minimum of several days and potentially much longer.
The campaign, dubbed “Operation Iron Wall,” includes drones and helicopter air support. There were also reportedly tanks in the vicinity – although not entering Jenin – and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), Duvdevan, Egoz, other special forces, and engineering forces from Battalion 90 were all involved.
The Committee to Project Journalists (CPJ) stated that China, Israel, and Myanmar are the “world’s three worst offenders” for imprisoning journalists in 2024, according to a report published by the organization on Thursday.
The report stated that while other egregious offenders, such as China, Myanmar, Belarus, and Russia, “routinely rank among the top jailers of journalists,” Israel rarely appeared in CPJ censuses before the October 7 massacre.
According to the report, Israel rose to second place as it “tried to silence coverage from the occupied Palestinian territories,” adding that “all detained by Israel on the day of CPJ’s census are Palestinian.” The CPJ report claims that 43 Palestinian journalists were held in Israeli custody as of December 1, 2024.
The report did not take into account that Israel has regularly discovered journalists either embedded with Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists, linked alleged journalists directly as members of terror groups, or killed terrorists whose journalistic ties are later revealed.However, the report did not focus exclusively on Israel but rather on the general increase of authoritarian arrests of journalists across the world, criticizing the authorities in China, Myanmar, Russia, and Belarus, respectively, to an equal extent.
“At least 10 journalists” are held in administrative detention centers where prisoners are subjected to “inhuman conditions,” the report added.
Lawyers who visited some of the detainees told CPJ that Israeli authorities informed the journalists that they were arrested because they had contacted individuals whom Israel wanted information about.
Such arrests are “symptomatic of Israel’s broader effort to prevent coverage of its actions in Gaza,” according to the report. CPJ also reported that Israel banned foreign correspondents from entering Gaza and banned Al Jazeera.
Other CPJ reports discussing Israel
CPJ Program Director Carlos Martinez de la Serna was quoted in a report titled Attacks, arrests, threats, censorship: The high risks of reporting the Israel-Gaza war that “Journalists have been paying the highest price – their lives – for their reporting” since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.
CPJ stated in the report that IDF spokespeople repeatedly tell media outlets that IDF policy does not deliberately target journalists and added that IDF reportedly told news agencies that they cannot guarantee the safety of journalists.
A separate January 17 report by CPJ stated that the journalists’ attorneys claimed their arrests by Israel were in retaliation for their journalism and commentary.
The January 17 report notes that 30 journalists, including three held by the Palestinian Authority, have been released since their arrests over the last 15 months.
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